

# Lotz and Lonergan: Two Jesuit Attempts to Engage Post-Modernity

by GERARD WHELAN S.J.\*



Johannes Baptist Lotz was a German Jesuit and much respected professor of the philosophy faculty of the Gregorian University, where he taught from 1952 until 1985. He was known as having strong credentials in Thomist metaphysics and as interpreting Thomas in a way that was innovative for his time. He formed part of the group of philosophers and theologians known as *Transcendental Thomists* who were influenced by Joseph Maréchal. This older Belgian Jesuit had interpreted Thomas in the light of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, employing a notion of the *turn to the subject* to ground metaphysics in epistemology and anthropology. In taking this approach, both Jesuits demonstrated instincts that derived from the notion of discernment of spirits found in *The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius*.

Lotz began his career in the Gregorian at a time of great vitality in the faculty, working with colleagues such as Bernard Lonergan. In this article, I begin with an outline of the thought of Lotz, and articulate certain criticisms of that have been made of it. I then compare the thought of Lotz to that of Lonergan and suggests that weaknesses in the thought of the former are overcome in the thought of the latter<sup>1</sup>. At the same time, I suggests that strengths are preserved of rooting a modern philosophical argument both in Thomism and in instincts that derive from *The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius*.

## Lotz, Maréchal, and Heidegger

Lotz never actually taught full-time at the Gregorian, but rather alternated semesters between Rome and the philosophate of the German province of the Jesuits. His first assigned course was Theodicy, the philosophical reflection on suffering, and in successive years he was given responsibilities for major courses in metaphysics. He also taught a variety of optional courses in aesthetics and existentialism. He had a lengthy publication record, beginning with a book published in 1938, *Sein und Wert* (Being and Value),

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<sup>1</sup> The following account of the life and thought of Lotz relies much on the article by Paul Gilbert, "La differenza e il bene in J.B. Lotz, in Id., *Saggi di metafisica II* (1955), Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Roma 1995, 120-138.

that established him as an important Thomist thinker<sup>2</sup>. Following the thought of Maréchal, this book explains how metaphysics can be grounded in an account of the knowing subject. This book first enunciates the principle to which Lotz would remain loyal throughout his life: «that transcendental experience is the condition of possibility of ontic experience»<sup>3</sup>.

This attentiveness to interiority continued when, in 1940, Lotz co-authored a book with another Jesuit in which expanded his philosophical reflection with to some inspired by spiritual and theological themes<sup>4</sup>. In succeeding decades, this interest in exploring interiority and in dialogue with modern thought led him to engage deeply with the thought of Martin Heidegger. Lotz was one of the first Catholic intellectuals to recognize the significance of Heidegger for modern culture and the importance of engaging respectfully with this thought. Much of his life's work can be understood as bringing the thought of Maréchal into dialogue with this German philosopher.

Heidegger criticizes the modern tendency to trust so much in technology as to lose a sense of what it means to be human. Articulating an *existentialist* argument, he suggests that full human living involves making free and responsible choices that have a creative effect both on the world around us and on our own characters. He speaks of a paradox of how we live finite lives and are destined to die, but at the same time possess a greatness because of our capacity to think and act in a creative manner. While this philosophy might seem immediately compatible with Christianity, Heidegger holds what can best be described as an ambiguous position on this point. To start with, he criticizes Christian theology and philosophy as having contributed to the major mistake of Western philosophy, that of thinking in an abstract and theoretical manner and *forgetting* the more existential realities of human living. He suggests that much of Western theology and philosophy had explained God as if he was an ordinary object of knowing, much like other objects in the universe. He speaks of this as a forgetfulness of the *ontological difference*, between God and all that is in the world.

By contrast with such a reductionistic approach to being, Heidegger proposes a somewhat ambiguous notion of *Dasein* which explains how the human individual participates in a larger process whereby being (*Dasein*) realizes itself through his or her decision-making. He suggests that individuals can choose to perform this task authenti-

<sup>2</sup> Gilbert offers the following publication list of books by Lotz, with special attention to those translated into Italian: J.B. LOTZ, *Transzendente Erfahrung*, Freiburg, Herder, 1978 (trad. ital. di M. Marassi: *Esperienza trascendentale*, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1993; *Vom Sein zum Heiligen. Metaphysisches Denken nach Heidegger*, Frankfurt-am-Main, Knecht, 1990 (trad. ital. di F. Stelzer: *Dall'essere al sacro*, Brescia, Queriniana, 1993; *Das Urteil und das Sein. Eine Grundlegung der Metaphysik*, Pullach bei München, Berchmanskolleg, 1957; *Martin Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin. Mensch-Zeit-Sein*, Pfullingen, Günther Neske, 1975; "La mia prospettiva filosofica" in AA.VV., *Filosofi tedeschi d'oggi*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1967, 250; "Identità e differenza in un confronto critico con Heidegger" in AA.VV., *La differenza e l'origine* (a cura di V. Melchiorre), Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1987, 280-301.

<sup>3</sup> GILBERT, 121.

<sup>4</sup> J.B. LOTZ - J. DE VREIS, *Die Welt des Menschen, Eine Vorschule zur Glaubenslehre*, Regensburg, Pustet, 1940.

cally and so to fulfill their potential. Alternatively, they can become “drifters”, who exhibit a *forgetfulness of being*, and avoid carrying such creative responsibility. Again, this call to responsible action might seem compatible with Christianity, but, at least in his early years, Heidegger makes a clear distinction between *Dasein* and God, suggesting that in order to protect the principle of ontological difference it is sufficient to respect the reality of and to participate responsibly in *Dasein*. However, in his later writings, Heidegger seems ready to reconsider this question. As he explores the flow of consciousness in the existential subject he recognizes that there exists a sense of the sacred and that can stimulate authentic participation in *Dasein*<sup>5</sup>.

In response to Heidegger, much of the thought of Lotz addresses the theme of a philosophy of God. However, he suggests that even at an ethical level there is an ambiguity in the thought of his fellow German philosopher. He suggests that, at times, Heidegger places so much stress on the irresistible force of *Dasein* in history that it seems capable of dispensing with the question of whether individuals are making a choice to cooperate with it or not<sup>6</sup>. Lotz was quite aware that Heidegger’s own behavior in the face of Nazism did not express the ability to take a firm stand against evil. As a corrective to Heidegger, he insists that talk of being must focus on the ability of the human individual to know truth and to act authentically:

The full explanation of the human individual points to being. And reflecting on being necessarily leads to a reflection on man and his full flourishing. Thus anthropology opens out onto ontology and ontology must be based on anthropology<sup>7</sup>.

This ethical concern leads Lotz to articulate his position on being and on God. First, however, he acknowledges that there exists a certain validity in the criticism which Heidegger makes of much of Western philosophy and theology. However, he suggests that what Heidegger criticises constitutes a decadence within Western tradition – especially associated with *nominalism* – and not its essential characteristic. He points to the manner in which St. Augustine spoke of God as «closer to me than I am to myself»; how

<sup>5</sup> Gilbert quotes an Italian translation of Heidegger on the notion of the sacred: «solo a partire dalla verità dell’essere si può pensare l’essere del sacro. Solo a partire dall’essenza del sacro si può pensare l’essenza della divinità. Solo alla luce dell’essenza della divinità si può pensare e dire che cosa debba nominare la parola “Dio”» Gilbert adds his own explanation of Heidegger’s argument, «Noi non possiamo intendere “Dio” che a partire da ciò che precede la sua rappresentazione, al di là degli enti determinati dai nostri metodi destinati all’ontico, solo «attraverso la chiarificazione della trascendenza» (GILBERT, 130, quoting M. HEIDEGGER, “Lettera sull’umanismo” in ID., *Segnavia*, 303).

<sup>6</sup> Gilbert paraphrases the critique Lotz offers of Heidegger’s ethics, «Tuttavia, una tale intesa dell’etica a partire dall’ontologia non ci soddisfa. Il “lasciar-essere” può identificarsi con un reale disimpegno della responsabilità. Può svuotare la pratica concreta di ogni significato e di ogni senso. L’*impasse* dell’etica conduce a porre delle questioni ad Heidegger sui suoi impegni politici. L’etica non dovrebbe tuttavia svilupparsi nell’attenzione al concreto della vita? Heidegger non si è fermato ad un’“estetica” dell’agire, nel senso di Kierkegaard? », GILBERT, 131.

<sup>7</sup> This is my translation of Gilbert quoting Lotz’s work, *Antropo-onto-logia*, «La spiegazione piena dell’uomo conduce all’essere, e all’essere si arriva solopassando per l’uomo. Perciò l’antropologia sbocca nell’ontologia e l’ontologia si fonda sull’antropologia» (GILBERT, 128).

this Church father spoke of God in terms of being and *infinite light*; and how he suggested that the enquiring mind represents a participation in the *intellectual light* that is God. He suggests that Aquinas carries forward this insight and articulates his own proposition that echoes both these authoritative Christian authors:

It <Being> reaches the innermost dimension of the individual. It is the ultimate foundation of the human person and at the same time forms part of his or her innermost self. Being is that within which the individual is most completely himself or herself<sup>8</sup>.

Lotz suggests that such an explanation of being as an innermost, and usually hidden, principle of our knowing and acting protects the notion of ontological difference which Heidegger was so eager to preserve. Then, following a Maréchal interpretation of Aquinas, he proposes an explanation of just how metaphysics must be rooted in anthropology. He speaks of the philosophical moment as beginning with an analysis of the transcendental experience that lies behind every act we make of judging truth. He claims to be able to «reveal what being is by conducting an analysis of the act of judgment»<sup>9</sup>. He suggests that each act of judgement involves an act of *formal abstraction* of the essence of a thing. Then, employing Kantian vocabulary, as does Maréchal, he invites the individual to reflect on the *condition of possibility* of having been able to make such a judgment. He suggests that the individual is compelled to agree that his or her ability to judge must have involved a certain limited participation in the knowledge of God himself, who alone can conduct not merely an act of formal abstraction, but also of *total abstraction*. He suggests that recognizing the nature of formal abstraction helps to establish an (indirect) understanding of Being and of God:

Being emerges as the condition of possibility of the act of judgment. In this way, we recognize the way in which humans relate to that which is infinite, in which our actions in time open out onto that which is timeless, i.e. to subsistent being, which is God himself<sup>10</sup>.

Lotz suggests that his account of anthropology and ontology is more adequate than that of Heidegger, but he returns to the terminology of Heidegger so as to stress convergences that exist between his thought with that of his fellow German. He takes up the

<sup>8</sup> My translation of Lotz, quoted in translation in Gilbert: «[Essere] raggiunge la dimensione più intima, cioè l'essere come fondamento ultimo dell'essente e nel contempo il sé più intimo dell'uomo, in cui egli è del tutto se stesso» (J.B. LOTZ, *Vom Sein zum Heiligen. Metaphysisches Denken nach Heidegger*, Frankfurt-am-Main, Knecht, 1990. Trad. ital. di F. Stelzer: *Dall'essere al sacro*, Brescia, Queriniana, 1993, 29. In GILBERT, 133.

<sup>9</sup> Gilbert states that the epistemology of Lotz seeks to explain how one can make «apparire l'essere mediante l'analisi del giudizio» J.B. LOTZ, *Das Urteil und das Sein. Eine Grundlegung der Metaphysik*, Pullach bei München, Berchmanskolleg, 1957, X. Quoted in GILBERT, 121.

<sup>10</sup> My partial translation of the following text: «Il confronto con queste <...> concezioni <di Kant, Hegel e Heidegger> farà risultare che da una parte la finitezza dell'operare umano dev'essere preservata e dall'altra che a questo stesso operare inerisce il rapporto all'essere, come sua più alta condizione di possibilità, precisamente il rapporto all'essere che per sé è infinito, attraverso il quale al tempo stesso viene aperto l'accesso all'Essere sussistente, cioè divino» J.B. LOTZ, «La mia prospettiva filosofica» in AA.VV., *Filosofi tedeschi d'oggi*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1967, 250. Quoted in GILBERT, 123.

comments of the late Heidegger on the inborn sense of the sacred which appertains to all individuals and suggests that this supports the account that he has offered of transcendental experience and its relationship to God. However, in spite of this nuance, his response to Heidegger remains essentially a Maréchalian one.

Finally, Gilbert offers a critique of the thought of Lotz. While, he largely agrees with the critique that Lotz provides of Heidegger, he is less convinced that Lotz succeeds in offering a persuasive alternative. To start with, he notes that Lotz performed little direct study of Aquinas, and was content merely to rely on the interpretation of Maréchal. Next, he states, «to tell the truth, one does not often see just where Thomas has made the philosophical assertions that Maréchal attributes to him»<sup>11</sup>. Finally, and perhaps most critically of all, Gilbert notes that a wide range of philosophers are critical of the thought of Maréchal on speculative grounds<sup>12</sup>. Another critic of Maréchal was Bernard Lonergan. However, like Lotz, Lonergan believed in the importance of developing a way of relating thinkers like Kant and Heidegger to a position that has roots in Thomas. Also like Lotz, one recognizes in Lonergan the self-reflective spirit of *The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius*. Consequently, Lonergan's critique of Lotz and Maréchal is more one of constructive criticism than is that of some of the authors quoted by Gilbert.

## Lonergan and Lotz

Lonergan arrived as a full-time professor at the Gregorian a year after Lotz and they would be colleagues and friends for the next twelve years. He had recently finished a draft for his major work on epistemology and metaphysics, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* that had many points of overlap with transcendental Thomism. He now found himself free to undertake new research projects and began a major study of modern and post-modern philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Wilhelm Dilthey. Insights deriving from this research would culminate in a set of major insights that would contribute to his publishing his second master-work in 1972, *Method in Theology*<sup>13</sup>.

In some writings of the 1950s, Lonergan makes explicit reference to his collaboration with Lotz had how this confrere helped him understand Heidegger. In fact, such was Lonergan's admiration for Lotz, as well as for other transcendental Thomists at the

<sup>11</sup> «A dire il vero, non si vede di frequente dove san Tommaso avrebbe definito queste determinazioni filosofiche come basi della sua argomentazione» (GILBERT, 123).

<sup>12</sup> Gilbert cites the following criticisms of Lotz: O. MUCK, *Die Transzendente Methode in der Scholastischen Philosophie der Gegenwart*, Innsbruck, Rauh, 1964; M. CAMPO, "Trascendentale kantiano e trascendentale della tradizione scolastica" in AA.VV., *Ricerche sul trascendentale kantiano* (a cura di A. Rigobello), Padova, Antenore, 1973, 259-269; V. MELCHIORRE, "Maréchal critico di Kant" in AA.VV., *Studi di filosofia trascendentale* (a cura di V. Melchiorre), Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1993, 3-48.

<sup>13</sup> B. LONERGAN, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, edited by Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Volume 3, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* (Toronto, 1992); *Method in Theology* (Toronto, 1972).

time, that he did not object to being described as part of this school. However, in the years after he published *Method in Theology*, he became increasingly clear that there were subtle but important differences between his thought and these others and he began to ask that he not be considered a transcendental Thomist<sup>14</sup>.

A study of the difference between Lonergan's thought and that of Lotz is illuminated by Gilbert's criticism of Lotz. To start with, Lonergan cannot be accused of not having studied Thomas Aquinas directly. Rather, from 1938-49, Lonergan had undergone what he described as an eleven-year apprenticeship to Aquinas, beginning with his doctoral studies on the theology of grace of Thomas and culminating in four articles on the cognitional theory of the Medieval doctor: *Verbum, Word and Idea in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas*. Writing these articles inspired Lonergan to proceed to composing *Insight*. Secondly, in the opinion of the present writer, *Insight* offers a proposal regarding the relationship of cognitional theory, to epistemology and metaphysics that is intellectually satisfying because it is empirically verifiable. Thirdly, in works such as *Method in Theology*, Lonergan integrates the thought of existentialist thinkers such as Heidegger more intrinsically into his thought than does Lotz<sup>15</sup>.

Already in the *Verbum* articles, one recognizes key differences in Lonergan's reading of Aquinas from that of Maréchal, differences that support Gilbert's suggestion that Maréchal's thought is not well grounded in that of the Angelic doctor. To begin with, Lonergan suggests that Aquinas does not focus so exclusively on the act of judgement as a starting point in analysing cognitional process. Rather, he discovers that the cognitional theory of Aquinas revolves around two distinct notions of the term *intelligere* (to understand). He suggests that the interest of Aquinas in cognitional theory was driven by his desire to find a basis in human nature for an analogical understanding of processions within the Trinity, processions which can allow for a distinction between two aspects of a reality without this distinction becoming two separate things.

According to Lonergan, the cognitional theory of Aquinas is as follows: First, an act of insight occurs where the mind grasps the *formal cause* of a sensible object by examining the phantasm of that object which has been created in the imagination. This act of insight is then followed by a *procession of an inner word (emanatio intelligibilis)*, which expresses in conceptual form what the mind has just grasped. Next, the mind's participation in *intellectual light* compels it to move from mere insight, which answers the question, "What is it?", to an act of judgment which answers the question, "Is it so?" What

<sup>14</sup> For comments by Lonergan on Lotz, see Lonergan, *Phenomenology and Logic*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 18 (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2001), 278. Andrew Beards traces Lonergan's relationship to transcendental Thomism in «Generalized Empirical Method» (A. BEARDS, in G. WHELAN (ed), *Lonergan's Anthropology Revisited: The Next Fifty Years of Vatican II* (Rome, G&B Press, 2015), 103-128.

<sup>15</sup> B. LONERGAN, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 2 (Toronto, 1997); For an extensive analysis relating Heidegger to Lonergan, see Frederick Lawrence, «Lonergan's Search for a Hermeneutics of Authenticity: Re-originating Augustine's Hermeneutics of Love», *Lonergan's Anthropology Revisited*, 19-56.

now occurs is a moment of *reduction or division (resolutio in principia)* where the mind appeals to the foundational principles of intellectual light to check if its first act of *intelligere* was correct. What can next occur is a second form of *intelligere* where the mind grasps that all the conditions have been fulfilled to affirm the truth of a proposition. At this stage, a second procession of an inner word occurs where an act of judgment is made.

In Lonergan's *Verbum* articles, one is left in no doubt that Aquinas respected what Heidegger described as ontological difference. Aquinas states, «the very intellectual light that is in us is nothing other than a participated similitude of the uncreated light»<sup>16</sup>. What is more, this participation occurs at two distinct cognitional levels, involving distinct acts of *intelligere*. First our minds move from the act of understanding's grasp of the intelligibility in images based on the sensible data to "valid concepts of essence and true affirmations of existence, because such procession is in virtue of our intellectual light, which is a participation of eternal Light"<sup>17</sup>.

In comparing this analysis of Aquinas with that of Maréchal, one finds that Lonergan would consider as false any suggestion that Aquinas encourages us to reflect on cognitional activity based only on an analysis of the act of judgment. Next, echoing the critique of Maréchal by Gilbert, Lonergan suggests that Aquinas does not invite a reader to anything like an act of transcendental self-reflection.

As soon as Lonergan had written his *Verbum* articles, he felt inspired to bring such ideas into dialogue with modern philosophers such as Descartes and Kant. He recognized the value of the *turn to the subject* of these thinkers and recognized that, while Aquinas had offered a penetratingly accurate description of cognitional process he was not of an age where one would think of inviting individuals to advert explicitly to their own subjectivity. However, Lonergan asserts that it is only by taking this explicit step that one can move from mere cognitional theory to an epistemology which can establish – with empirical certainty – that "I am a knower." Consequently, for all his admiration of the cognitional theory of Aquinas he states: «As an ontology of knowing it is satisfactory, as an epistemology it is null and void»<sup>18</sup>.

In *Insight* Lonergan advances from cognitional theory to epistemology and from there to metaphysics. He invites his readers to engage in a moment of *intellectual conversion*. This begins with individuals accepting that one can expand one's notion of empirical attentiveness – so respected in the age after the Scientific Revolution – to a sustained attentiveness to the *data of consciousness*. He then invites readers to recognize that our conscious activities are structured according to three cognitional levels – much as Aquinas describes them. He then invites the reader to affirm himself or herself as a knower.

Self-affirmation involves performing a reflexive act of experiencing, understanding, and affirming as true the fact that one is characterized by these three cognitional levels.

<sup>16</sup> LONERGAN, *Verbum*, 85, citing Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 15, a. 2 c: *ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati.*

<sup>17</sup> LONERGAN, *Verbum*, 85-6.

<sup>18</sup> LONERGAN, *Verbum*, 86.

He suggests that this helps one to recognize for oneself that one's *pure to desire to know* ultimately *intends being*. In a sense, Lonergan's thought converges with that of Maréchal at this stage. He agrees that it is by an analysis of our act of judgment that we are able to affirm that we are knowers of being, and this gives us some limited participation in the life of God who is being in its fullness, including a perfect self-knowledge. However, conducting a deductive argument concerning "*a priori* conditions of possibility" for this judgment has no part of Lonergan's approach. Rather, it is in the experience of affirming for oneself that one really does reach the moment of the second type of *intelligere* described by Aquinas where one knows reality, that constitutes the breakthrough moment for epistemology and which permits an advance toward metaphysics.

Lonergan grounds his metaphysical statements on the insight that the *pure desire to know* that drives us through three cognitional levels «intends the concrete universe of being», and so reveals itself to be a *notion of being*.

The notion of being is the notion of the concrete in the same manner as it is of the universe. It is of the universe because questions end only when there is nothing more to be asked. It is of the concrete, because until the concrete is reached, there remain further questions. Hence it is not the single judgment but the totality of correct judgments that equates with the concrete universe that is being<sup>19</sup>.

Respecting a notion of ontological difference, Lonergan claims only that our unrestricted desire to know – our notion of being – seeks to know all that we can about the universe in which we live. It is by a "second order definition" that he speaks of the existence of God and agrees with Aquinas how states "the very intellectual light that is in us is nothing other than a participated similitude of the uncreated light"<sup>20</sup>.

Lonergan's account of intellectual conversion can be understood as an alternative form of the *transcendental reflection* proposed by Maréchal. It benefits from a dialogue with the turn to the subject of modern philosophy. However, as already implied above, Lonergan also offers a critique of that philosophy. Ultimately, he suggests that thinkers such as Descartes and Kant fail in their self-declared project of being attentive to subjectivity. He suggests that Kant turns to a deductive argument about *conditions of possibility* to sustain his epistemology, without empirically affirming the existence of the kind of *a priori* conditions for knowing that he retains to exist. Lonergan suggests that this argument involves a kind of short-circuiting of the journey to self-knowledge and results, ultimately, in the problem of "idealism" where a gulf remains between subjectivity and objectivity.

Students of Lonergan have suggested that Maréchal adopts this same Kantian strategy and attributes it, inaccurately, to Aquinas<sup>21</sup>. Consequently, we can conclude that Lotz – who follows Maréchal so closely – suggests that we should begin transcendental

<sup>19</sup> LONERGAN, *Insight*, 387.

<sup>20</sup> LONERGAN, *Verbum*. 85, citing Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 15, a. 2 c: *ipsum enim lumen intellectuale quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati*.

<sup>21</sup> See, M. VERTIN, «The Finality Of Human Spirit: From Maréchal To Lonergan», *Lonergan Workshop*: Volume 19, Ed. Fred Lawrence (Boston, 2006), 267-286.

reflection with an analysis of the conditions of possibility of making a judgement, he is making two mistakes. He attributes to Aquinas a transcendental argument that the medieval thinker was incapable of making; and he fails to recognize that, anyway, this argument is unconvincing as it fails to provide the empirical basis for epistemology that is achieved only by an act of intellectual conversion.

An additional question remains about what value Lonergan took from his reading of Heidegger and how this relates to use that Lotz made of this thinker. First, Lonergan, like Gilbert, largely agrees with the analysis, both positive and negative, that Lotz makes of Heidegger. He cites Lotz in making a broader criticism of existentialism in general:

In Heidegger, to a less extent in Sartre, but really in the whole movement, truth arises as the fundamental problem <...> Fr. Lotz – he was a pupil of Heidegger <...> states that on Heidegger's position it is not possible to prove the existence of God because of the method on which the position rests<sup>22</sup>.

However, in spite of this criticism of existentialism, Lonergan includes aspects of this philosophical movement to a striking degree. What is more, he describes Heidegger as «the most profound of the lot» and praises his attempts at producing «a phenomenology of the existing man»<sup>23</sup>.

Lonergan spent much of the 1950s reading widely in phenomenology, existentialism, and hermeneutical thought. This brought him new insights which helped him expand his notion of the levels of consciousness and of conversion. The most important fruit of this was the insight he gained into how an *empirical* approach to theological method would require that it be based on a notion of *functional specialization*. However, part of this insight included distinguishing a fourth level of consciousness from a third, and in making this step, Lonergan was indebted to existentialism. This level begins with an *affective response to value*, a *judgement of value* (that constitutes a third act of *intelligere*, to use Thomistic language) and proceeds (in a third *procession of an inner word*) to an act of *decision*. In this account of a level of consciousness devoted to decision-making Lonergan especially appreciated the existentialist account of how the decisions we make often have more impact on our own self-construction as authentic individuals than they do on the world around us. He would extend this insight to speak of the Church as a process of authentic self-construction, with a mission of being a catalyst in the processes self-construction of world culture.

However, much as Lonergan criticised Kant for not completing the turn to subject, so also he criticised existentialists for not doing justice to the manner in which the divine is at the heart of our ability to affirm value just as much as it is to affirm truth. In this respect, he spoke of *transcendental notions* of the intelligible, the true, and the good,<sup>24</sup>

<sup>22</sup> LONERGAN, *Phenomenology and Logic*, 278. Lonergan also notes that Heidegger was once a Jesuit novice and «gives us an apostate's understanding of human existence», Lonergan thus seeks to learn from Heidegger, while restoring a place for God in any existentialist notion of *Dasein* (Philosophical and Theological Papers, 1958-64, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Volume 6 [Toronto, 1996] 189).

<sup>23</sup> LONERGAN, *Phenomenology and Logic*, 250, 274.

and added to his account of intellectual conversion, explanations of moral and religious conversions, both of which are registered at the fourth level of consciousness. In fact, Lonergan suggests that most people will only move to intellectual conversion as a result of a prior religious and moral conversion. This seems to overlap with the appeal that Lotz makes to a sense of the sacred as a stimulus for transcendental reflection.

## Conclusion

Some penetrating criticisms of the thought of Johannes Lotz that can be developed on the basis of Lonergan's thought. However, these can ultimately be understood as friendly and constructive criticisms. A number of philosophers cited by Gilbert suggest that philosophy today has moved beyond the call to a transcendental reflection such as that made by Lotz. By contrast, Lonergan suggests that an act of *self-appropriation of conscious intentionality* remains important, but needs to be understood more comprehensively than does Lotz. Finally, we can note that both these Gregorian professors of the 1950s and 60s pursued an approach that has deep resonance with Ignatian spirituality, a spirituality which I suggest has an abiding importance. Each of them offered invitations to philosophical self-reflection that echoes the call of St. Ignatius to a regular *examination of consciousness* and an effort to discern whether one is experiencing *consolation*, which prompts authentic decision-making, or *desolation*, which obstructs one's cooperation with the will of God. No doubt there is much to build upon, and even correct, in the thought of both Lotz and Lonergan: However I suggest that they both deserve to be rediscovered in this globalizing age where there is such need to reflect on what is the authentic way forward for both individual living and for history.

<sup>24</sup> LONERGAN, *Method in Theology*, 34-36.